Reconsidering Henry VII’s role in the Breton Crisis

A few years ago, back in 2019, I wrote a post about the Breton Crisis. This is an often over-looked period of Tudor foreign policy, with many people much preferring to spend their time reading and understanding more dramatic events, such as the Spanish Armada or Henry VIII’s invasions of France. After all, Henry VII was – generally speaking – not a proactive monarch in terms of attempting to invade and create wars, and was much more focused on securing his rule and dynasty. However, the Breton Crisis offers an interesting opportunity to reflect and reconsider Henry VII’s foreign policy focus.

As a brief explainer, the Breton Crisis took place when the kingdom of France set out to capture the duchy of Brittany, which is situated in the north-eastern corner of modern-day France. This duchy had a level of autonomy, with the duke offering fealty to the French king. However, on the death of Duke Francis, the French decided on absorbing the duchy more fully within its territories, thereby setting off a war known as the Breton Crisis.

Henry VII was dragged into this war for a couple of key reasons. Firstly, he had lived in Brittany for more than a decade after going on the run from the Yorkists in 1471, and remained there until he shortly set off to conquer the English throne (which culminated at the Battle of Bosworth in 1485). So, it is expected that he had strong connections to the duchy and felt bound to it. Secondly, there was a wider feeling – in England and in other courts of Europe – that an expanded and more powerful France was not a good idea. Absorbing the duchy would mean that France would control even more of the English Channel, thereby potentially disrupting trade and posing a greater threat to England’s security.

So, Henry VII signed the Treaty of Redon with the Bretons (who were now ruled by Francis’ daughter, Anne) in 1489. This military alliance stated that England would provide ships and men to defend Brittany, whilst other countries – such as Spain – also came to assist. There are modern echoes here of the ongoing war in the 2020s in Ukraine, with countries supplying arms and money to help defend that country against Russia.

However, England struggled to maintain this presence. Firstly, the need to tax the nation in order to fund the military expenses led to the outbreak of rebellion in the north; this Yorkshire Rebellion of 1489 saw one of Henry’s regional earls killed (the poor Earl of Northumberland), and even after ending this threat, only £27,000 out of £100,000 was collected in tax. Secondly, as the years of war in Brittany rumbled on, England sent fewer and fewer reinforcements. Thirdly, there was great disagreement between the English and Breton commanders, leading to the growth of tension and outright bloodshed in some instances between these defenders. Fourthly – and finally – the other allies (such as Spain and the Holy Roman Empire) bailed on Brittany by signing separate peace deals with France. All of this meant that by 1491, Brittany buckled and France took control of it.

So, at this point, the Breton Crisis was a complete failure for Henry: he failed to achieve any of his objectives whilst also spending huge sums of money. Furthermore, he had poked the French bear, which led to consequences when the French decided to support the claims of the pretender Perkin Warbeck. Warbeck claimed to be one of the “princes in the Tower” who vanished in 1483 (most likely killed); and these princes held a much stronger claim to the English throne than anyone with Tudor blood. As such, England was now very much on the defensive.

I wrote about this point in time in my book The Tudor Empire:

This, then, was the new threat to the still new and fragile Tudor dynasty: a pretender who now had the ear of the French. Yes, Henry had already dealt with one pretender in Lambert Simnel, but Simnel never had assistance from the powerful kingdom of France. What if France repeated the level of help that was provided to Henry himself back in 1485? Ships, men, money; Warbeck could soon be heading to England to rally the lingering Yorkist sympathies in the North. Henry was now playing a dangerous game.

Henry VII’s foreign policy stance has often been described as reactive (very much by myself, I must admit). However, what he does at this point is very much proactive, and could be described as a gamble. He ups the ante and the tension by invading France itself! Some historians, such as John M. Currin, believe that Henry was now out of options, and that he was involved so deep in the quagmire that only an invasion ‘could salvage his honour and turn his loss into some kind of profit’. So, like a gambler too far in the red, Henry needed one final bet – placing everything on black – in a desperate attempt to reverse his fortunes.

The invasion consisted of 12,000 men, and they arrived in northern France in October 1492. This was enough pressure to bring France to the negotiating table, and by the end of the year both countries signed the Treaty of Etaples. This treating brought long-lasting peace (only broken in the early years of the reign of Henry VIII in the 1510s), and it established an understanding of key areas of disagreement. England secured an annual payment from France (the “French pension” of £5,000 per year), whilst France also rejected Warbeck’s claim (and promised to no longer harbour him). However, in return Henry had to acknowledge that Brittany was now a part of France.

So, was this success or failure? Clearly Henry’s intention to defend Brittany failed. But the Etaples can be considered a success, with some historians praising its features (such as security of the Tudor throne and a nice pay-out). In my book The Tudor Empire, I attempted to evaluate these positions of success and failure:

What are we to make of the Tudor involvement in the Breton Crisis? And to what extent was Henry a perpetrator of war? The majority of historians view Henry VII as a man of peace who had limited intentions in terms of desiring further lands beyond his own kingdom. The Breton Crisis and French invasion could be seen, then, as the actions of a monarch who had no real desire for war, but who defended Brittany out of loyalty, as well as for the chance to secure a hefty pay-out if the French overwhelmed the Bretons. As historian P.S. Crowson claims, Henry simply ‘went through the motions’ without fully committing. However, the cost and energy spent in the period 1489–92 – to the tune of £124,000 – shows, in the words of John M. Currin, that Henry, ‘who was never frivolous in expenditure, was engaged in a serious military undertaking’. The debate continues regarding Henry’s intentions: was he a man of peace – described by his poet laureate as ‘Rex Pacificus’ – or rather someone who ultimately desired the French throne? If the cards had fallen differently and if Brittany had been defended, perhaps Henry would have used this as the first step in ‘a future campaign for recovery of Normandy, and Guyenne, and perhaps even the French Crown itself’.

And this specific chapter in the book – ‘The French Connection’ – concludes:

But despite the claims of some historians, it is unrealistic to believe that Henry had such wide ambitious dreams. His involvement in the Breton Crisis highlighted the incapability of the English government to wage a full-scale war, with the majority of his military actions being defensive rather than offensive. When Henry put pen to paper on the peace treaty at the end of 1492 he did so in the belief that his honour had been safeguarded, and more importantly, that his kingdom was now secure from the threat of the French. In this view, and particularly regarding the context of the early part of the Tudor period – not yet on the throne for a decade – the entire Breton Crisis and French invasion was a success.

Success or failure? Proactive or reactive? You can decide.