Stagnation & Missed Opportunities: the Brezhnev Era in the USSR

Having recently posted up one of old degree essays – on the decline of the Mediterranean economy – I thought I would post another one which focused on the final decades of the USSR. During my degree programme – at Plymouth Marjons in the 2000s – I was fortunate enough to pick a module on 20th century Russian history. But rather than delve into the popular periods of the Soviet Union, such as the revolution of 1917 or Stalin’s dictatorship – I became interested into debates as to why it ended.

All of this led me to pick a question relating to the Brezhnev era (and Brezhnev’s incredibly distinctive eyebrows). I really enjoyed researching this essay, simply because there was no specific text or book that I could use to help me navigate the debate. Without this, I improvised by widening my research, which turned up lots of interesting – and contrasting – pieces of information. So, here is the essay on my blog; surprisingly, there is a lack of coverage of Russian history on this blog, so perhaps this is an attempt to re-address this dearth of material!

In the 1970s a joke characterizing Soviet leaders, past and present, circulated throughout the Soviet Union:

‘Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev are all travelling together in a railway carriage. Unexpectedly the train stops. Lenin suggests: “Perhaps, we should call a subbotnik, so that workers and peasants fix the problem.” Stalin puts his head out of the window and shouts, “If the train does not start moving, the driver will be executed!” But the train doesn’t start moving. Khrushchev then shouts, “Let’s take the rails behind the train and use them to construct the tracks in front.” But still nothing moves. Brezhnev then says, “Comrades, Comrades, let’s draw the curtains, turn on the gramophone and pretend we’re moving!”’

Of the Soviet leaders only Lenin comes out in a positive light; but even Stalin and Khrushchev are depicted as men of action. Leonid Brezhnev, the last of the four, is content to sit back and merely spectate. It is a portrayal in which historians have adorned, time and again, upon Brezhnev; the image of being deemed a leader ‘not there at all’ is one his legacy cannot shake off.

In relation to other Soviet periods, the Brezhnev era has inspired a relatively small amount of study; yet those who have researched the 1970s of the USSR have concluded that it was one of great paradoxes and contrasts. The second-longest serving General Secretary oversaw a strong and stable political regime, ‘but one’, notes Ronald Grigor Suny, ‘that proved to be the prelude to political instability and the collapse of the system’. The USSR became all the more powerful abroad yet at home it slowly corroded. Hailed as ‘something of a success story’ during its tenure, since the Soviet Union’s end more and more historians have confidently exposed the ominous pitfalls that plagued state and society – however, such a confidence was not as easily expressed by those writing in the 1970s. The intention of this essay is to note such growing weaknesses – such as the economy – whilst analysing the inability of the leadership to reform in the face of such staggering problems. It is this question in which historians are most concerned about: Was the Soviet system simply unable to change and refresh itself?

Ultimate failure has soured the accomplishments Brezhnev enjoyed whilst head of the USSR. However, his contemporaries – both within Soviet borders and in the West  – portrayed a strong and stable state; and nowhere was its strength on display than in the international arena; on which Vladimir Andrle believes the ‘Brezhnev regime brought Russian imperial power to its historical zenith’.

The build-up of Soviet arms has been widely remarked upon; from the position of underdog in the middle of the century, the USSR achieved parity in missile production with the USA towards the end of the 1970s. The navy vastly expanded to become a global force, whilst in other areas tank production increased by 40 percent, tactical airpower by 25 percent, and artillery by 60 percent. Interestingly, the military built frantically amidst a thaw in US relations: stand out points including President Nixon visiting Moscow in May 1972; the arrangement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty; and the ceasefire agreement ending the superpowers’ involvement in the Vietnam war. This new spirit of negotiation (labelled as détente) reached a high point with the signing of the Helsinki agreement in 1975. The continued growth of both force and prestige led to the Soviet Union enjoying a wide influence around the world, with alliances and agreements being reached with countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

Whilst within the borders of the USSR, citizens enjoyed a continuing rise in living standards. Stephen White notes how Gross Social Product doubled between 1960 to 1970, having trebled by 1980; industrial production more than quadrupled; real incomes of people more than doubled; three times as many were in higher education than at any other period of Soviet history; adding that ‘there were more hospital beds, more flats, more motor cars, more refrigerators, and very many more TVs’. It is little wonder, then, that when asked in the 1990s, Russian people stated they would prefer to live during Brezhnev’s era than at any other period in the twentieth century.

In the 1960s, the continuing rise of economic growth led Brezhnev’s predecessor – Khrushchev – to declare that by 1980 the USSR would overtake their chief rival, the USA. Yet it was a future that never materialised; the levels of growth were not sustained and fell year by year, with the optimism of the 1960s being replaced by an atmosphere of stagnation in the leadership and throughout society. The growth of the USSR – strong and vibrant in the 1950s (rates of 10-15 percent a year)– slowed down in the Brezhnev years: 5 percent average in the 1960s, to 3.8 percent in the early 1970s, 2.8 percent and finally 1.2 percent in the first two years of the 1980s. Such a downturn presented a tremendous problem to the leadership; it was upon the economy on which their military might and international prestige relied upon.

Suny points out other ‘unsettling trends’, including the slow rise of labour productivity and the fall of overall capital. By 1980 any notions of overtaking the US remained a pipe dream, with state efficiency at about 34 percent of those of the Americans. The decline in service quality was continually criticised, with queuing, states James R. Millar, becoming ‘a major activity of adult Soviet citizens’, whilst the goods themselves were of poor quality. ‘In an era…of industrial innovation’, wrote Ronald J. Hill in the 1980s, ‘the Soviet Union is manifestly not managing to maintain that pace, let alone overtake its rivals’.

There were inherent problems within the system; one of which was its inability to produce the required consumer goods to what was becoming a more demanding population. Although there was a substantial increase of consumer goods (production of cars increasing six-fold, TV sets doubling, refrigerators more than trebling), consumption within the USSR remained ‘the stepchild of Soviet economic priorties’. Despite earlier rapid growth under Stalin, the economy was unable to transition with similar success from the preference of heavy industry to that of consumer goods (from Group A to that of Group B). Gains were accomplished, but not on the rate of heavy industry:

Although consumer goods became a priority for the Brezhnev leadership (as shown in the prominence of that field in the Five-Year Plans of the period), a victory could not be proclaimed within this field. Goldman suggests the USSR was faced ‘with a kind of basic paradox’, continuing:

‘The Soviet system has perhaps settled some of the major problems besetting modern economies – but only to create still others’.

In contrast, agriculture remained a long-standing problem since the birth of the Soviet state, having been branded “the Achilles heel” of the economy. Hill notes how it has been a ‘constant source of disappointment’, whilst D. Gale Johnson simply casts its performance as ‘dismal’. From a growth rate of 3.9 percent between 1964 and 1970, it averaged only 1.2 percent during the 1970s, slumping lower and lower towards the end of the Brezhnev period. The USSR was unable to feed its population with its own produce, having to bring in much grain from its chief rival, the United States. By 1985 imports of grain exceeded the value of exports by $16 billion – an astronomical figure when one considers the farming potential of the Soviet Union. Yet even such vast imports were not enough to conceal the problems. Hill notes how by the early 1980s ‘butter, meat and other basic foodstuffs – not to mention more exotic products– are reported to have all but disappeared for much of the year in many provincial towns and cities’. The below table shows the lacklustre performance of Soviet agricultural production between 1970-1980:

By the end of the 1970s, 27 percent of the capital investment budget of the USSR was pumped into agriculture, which as Suny notes, was a figure double that of investment in the 1950s; whilst the USA, ‘with its much higher agricultural yields, put only 5 percent of its total investment into agriculture’. Furthermore, despite cultivating more land and greater money, it produced one-sixth less in ‘output value’ than the United States. The dreadful climate could not be the only reason of blame; inefficient and outdated techniques were still in place, whilst the demoralized atmosphere that plagued the farmers stretched back to the gruesome terror of the collectivization period.

Yet despite such obvious problems and a slowdown within the economy, the USSR continued to extravagantly build up its arms. The 1977 constitution committed the state to supply the armed forces with ‘everything necessary’ in the pursuit of security, however, such a burden proved to be a strain on the remaining budget. With G.N.P. half the size of the USA, the only way the Soviet Union could compete was to devote more and more resources on defence than the Americans; a strategy which appeared all the more ominous with the arrival of Reagan in the White House.

Alec Nove asks: ‘Why this great effort in the military field?’ Understandably, despite the feeling of détente between the USSR and USA, there remained the Chinese threat. However, the military muscle must be seen as a smokescreen to disguise the Soviet Union’s internal problems. More than one historian notes the international and domestic questions were closely bound. As Andrei Amalrik observes, the reason why a stagnating regime seeks international success is ‘perhaps they seek a way out of their domestic problems through their foreign policies’. Furthermore, it must be added that there were personal reasons for such decisions; Suny perceptively highlights a reason, stating that the military was one of Brezhnev’s ‘most stable bases of his own power’, and he conceded to their demands to continue support.

The problems provided no simple answers. The resources on which previous regimes had greedily fed were now exhausted, the landscape and the people having been pillaged for decades. Suny believes the ‘crude centralized planning’ that had reaped the easy gains, that had characterized the Stalin years, ‘was unable to provide for a more advanced industrial economy’. In the light of such problems, what were the attempts of internal reform? In relation to the agriculture problem significant sums were invested ‘so that by the second half of the 1970s one rouble in three was being invested directly or indirectly in argiulcture’. This constant injection of money was attempted in other economic fields other than agriculture. Much of the early reforming vigour was influenced by the ‘pioneering article’ by Yevgeny Liberman in the early 1960s, in which decentralisation was suggested as the key to free the economy, allowing the managers at ground level to decisively act. It was a theme returned to again and again over the following two decades (significantly in 1973 and 1979). The reforms, however, were not radical, nor far-reaching, and were implemented without the enthusiasm required (Bialer & Gustafon calling the NNO – normative net output – a ‘third-best reform’). Furthermore, the system proved remarkably stubborn to any notion of change; each reform, states Richard Sakwa, ‘ran into the sand of bureaucratic obstruction’, with any gains ultimately lost.

Rather than tackle the problems with the right gusto, the regime appeared to bank its hopes on trade and technological exchange with the West. However, the friendly understanding reached by the USSR and USA during the 1970s appears to have been exaggerated, especially considering the dramatic collapse by 1980 of the cordial mood that had been so carefully constructed for a decade. The banking of hopes on such trade displays a serious reluctance of the leaders to face the economic dilemma. As Hough notes, ‘there comes a point when a well-functioning economy should become less imitative and more innovative’, as in the case of the USA and Japan. The USSR appeared unable to achieve this and to continue evolving into the twenty-first century.

It must be stated that there were real fears for the USSR in implementing reforming polices. Giving greater freedom to businesses could have raised prices significantly, further leading to unrest from the people. Unemployment – a thing proudly stated by the USSR to have been long extinct – would arguably become widespread if enterprises were given the freedom to cost-cut and achieve greater efficiency for their money. Whilst the greatest danger in loosening the grip on economic power would be the fear that it would lead to a fall in political power; as the 1968 Prague Spring shown, this was something the Soviet elite would never allow to happen.

If the leadership was misguided and deluded in its hopes for renewal, the fear of losing control forced them to destroy any independent, critical thought within its own borders. Sakwa highlights the dissident movement, believing that here was an opportunity for the party leadership to partake in a forum of debate to tackle the USSR’s mounting problems. Yet the leadership, rather than continue the “thaw” of the Khrushchev period, RELAPSED back to repression; the trials of Siniavsky and Uuli Daniel in the mid-1960s being seen as landmark events and a return to the persecution experienced in Stalin’s day. (To Nove’s calculation in the early 1980s, the USSR had about ‘as many political prisoners as had Tsarist Russia in 1900’.) Such measures, believes Andrei Amalrik, led to the:

‘Elimination from society of the most independent-minded and active of its members…has left an imprint of greyness and mediocrity on all strata of society’.

The quashing of the Prague Spring in 1968 led to a more consistent, strengthened dissident movement – questioning the leadership at every move with letters, petitions and underground, self-published (samizdad) publications (such as the Chronicle of Current Events). The punishment meted out to these intellectuals, such as Valery Tarsis, who was confined to a mental ward, and the popular Alexander Solzhenitsyn promoted their protests. Their numbers may not have been large, but as Treadgold & Ellison point out, ‘there were not many Decembrists in 1824 or Bolsheviks in 1903 either’.

The quashing of such ‘loyalist reformist ideas’ (such as the end of Tvardovskii’s twelve years as editor of Novy Mir), and the simple lack of acknowledgment of Roy Medvedev’s open letter of 1970 (on which Sakwa believes ‘could be taken as a blueprint for Gorbachev’s reforms a generation later’) created a clear dividing line between dissidents and the elite, to which Vladimir Andrle and others hold Brezhnev wholly responsible. Furthermore, the government’s severe actions shattered what was once a cohesive dissident movement: from being socialist and loyalist in principle other more forcible opinions flourished, such as that of the chauvinist patriotic right, all of which lost faith in the socialist system (as seen in the short space between Medvedev’s socialist open letter in 1970 to Solzhenitysn’s more nationalist letter in 1973).

Towards the end of the Brezhnev period the “success story” became one of misery: food shortages, a fall in life expectancy (Suny noting the poor health and diet of people), an increase in alcoholism, decline in the health service, education and housing – all of which, states Mary McAuley, ‘began to creak at the seams’. Many historians note the increasing alienation of the public from politics, and even a loss of belief in Soviet ideology (to couple that of intellectuals). Previous regimes had inspired people (such as Stalin and the grand forging of Magnitogorsk and Khrushchev Virgin Lands campaign); yet the Brezhnev regime only turned people away. The young surged to other sub-cultures (punks and football hooligans being two notable examples), and looked to other heroes who appeared to speak the truth, such as Alexander Galich and Vladimir Vysotsky. The leadership had nothing comparable to offer. A contributor to an émigré journal stated:

‘The young neither fight against communism, argue against it, nor curse it; something much worse has happened to communism: they laugh at it’.

As McAuley adds, the constant emphasis on stability ‘could not enthuse and unite the party, let alone the youth’.

Meanwhile, the international arena, too, appeared to be collapsing. By Brezhnev’s death in 1982 the “understanding” between the world’s two superpowers were at a low ebb: Afghanistan was invaded (President Carter calling it the ‘greatest danger to peace since World War II’), the Olympic games were boycotted (by the Americans in Moscow, 1980, and by the Soviets in Los Angeles, 1984); whilst the new Reagan administration of the 1980s pushed the arms race to new heights.

In light of such failed attempts it must be asked: what were the obstacles that prevented the leadership from reinvigorating both economy and society? Many factors are debated, including the generation gap and the privileges of the elite; yet a more pervasive problem is found: the foundations of the Stalinist system. Many historians – most notably Jerry Hough and Donald Treadgold – highlight the age of the elite party members, citing it as a reason for unwillingness to change. There was a significant generational difference between Brezhnev’s generation – or more commonly titled “Stalin’s generation” – and those who had yet to wield power, such as those of Gorbachev’s age. By 1980 the inner-ruling four (Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Kirilenko) averaged seventy-five years old; whilst the average age of voting members rose ‘from fifty-eight in 1966 to sixty-two in 1972 and to seventy in 1980’. Compare this with Khrushchev’s more thrusting regime, in which from 1956 to 1961 he replaced over two-thirds of the Politburo and Council of Ministers. Suny believes Brezhnev was ‘as cautious and unwilling to take risks as Khrushchev had been impetuous and bold’. An aging – and increasingly ill – party elite would be less willing to push for the reform required, as found in the inactivity of the last congresses of Brezhnev’s reign.

Privilege, also, is stated as a significant reason: personal cost outweighed any greater desire for the disruption of reform. With the exclusive top stable, younger rivals were kept away from the Politburo, thus keeping, states McAuley, ‘contentious issues off the agenda’. The top would not upset the balance, and those below them defended their interests; it was a victory for the nomenklatura. All of this resulted in widespread corruption and a misuse of resources, whilst publicly values of stability and patriotism were promoted. In 1978, Lev Kopelev (an émigré) would state:

‘We are ruled not by a Communist or a fascist party and not by a Stalinist party, but by a status quo party’.

If age and privilege were the significant barriers to reform, then a young and thrusting leader – a man of principle – could have been expected to have brought in the changes needed. Gorbachev is hailed as one such man; however, his actions led to the collapse of the whole of the Soviet Union. As the evidence shows, the Stalinist system – tough and durable – could not be altered and expected to continue operating.

The vast similarities between Brezhnev and Stalin have been widely noted. Within the spring-days of Brezhnev’s era, the title of First Secretary had already returned to that of the Stalinist “General Secretary”. Khrushchev’s desire to demilitarize society was reversed, with the army given ‘a high profile on public occasions’ and Brezhnev adorned with the ‘supreme military rank’; whilst, continues Andrle, society was pumped full with ‘propaganda themes devoted to war heroism and Great Russian nationalism’. Brezhnev became known as the party’s ‘universally acclaimed leader’, it’s vozhd (chief), ‘a term’, which White observes, ‘previously used to describe Stalin’. There appears to have been real fears of a renewal of the personality cult that reached such drastic heights under Stalin. Brezhnev collected innumerable amounts of medals and awards (including the Lenin Prize for Literature for his memoirs!); Jokes circulated that ‘if Brezhnev received any more medals he would have to have an operation to have his chest expanded’.

Although it must stated that the terror and respect experienced in Stalin’s tenure of power was never reached under Brezhnev (McAuley calling it ‘a pale shadow, a mockery’ in comparison), the wealth of similarities proves that the system born by force by Stalin was unable to adapt to changing times. Mark R. Beissinger notes the considerable features of ‘the clumsy mechanism of central planning, the grossly inefficient collective-farm program, the priority of military investment, the country’s shackled intellectual and cultural life’. As the Soviet economy developed, the Stalinist system could not simply keep pace; in the words of Alfred Evans Jr, it became ‘a hindrance to further economic growth’, rather than its provider. This is shown in the economy’s inability to successfully transfer to a consumer-led market. Whilst the abuses experienced within the system, with had lingered for decades, only served to create larger problems. Such difficulties plagued Stalin’s successors, from Khrushchev through to Gorbachev. And it was Gorbachev, the last General Sectary, who would vehemently blame the ‘administrative-command’ pattern of control as being the chief cause to the Soviet Union’s dilemma, and eventual collapse.

The Stalinist system not only affected the economy, but also the whole spirit of the Union. Evans cites the words of Abalkin, who believed authoritarian methods led to the ‘alienation of the masses from property and the system of management’. This in turn led to a demoralised and dejected population. In analysing this aspect, Stephen F. Cohen concluded that conservatism spread throughout all corners of the Union, believing that Brezhnev could be viewed as ‘a reflection of broad and deep currents throughout Soviet officialdom and society’. He adds that public opinion polls in the 1970s concluded that ‘ordinary Soviet citizens…are even more conservative than some segments of the ruling elite’.

The Stalinist system only served to foster such attitudes, actively suppressing intellectual discussion and free thought. This lack of questioning resulted in a leadership that became all the more feeble to the mental demands placed upon them. Brezhnev has been labelled ‘a product of [Stalin’s] school’, continuing: ‘It lacks originality and brilliance, is philosophically almost null and void, and is without revolutionarily élan. It is made up of conscientious administrators’. Stalin’s legacy was one of red-tape, a sprawling ‘spider’s web of administrative structures’, rather than one of socialist thinking. Little wonder, then, that Brezhnev, a man of this thinking, did not push harder for reform. He, himself, is reputed to have spoken of Kosygin:

‘What is he thinking of? Reform, reform. Who needs it, and who can understand it? We need to work better, that is the only problem’.

It was the Stalinist legacy that choked the life out of any attempt at renewal within society. It lashed out at attempts outside its borders that endeavoured for change, as was the instance of the Czechoslovakian example; and at home it continually stamped and snuffed out the very voices that could have led to its regeneration. Whilst on the defence, it refrained from making big decisions for fear of possible resulting dangers. Ultimately, the system proved unable to adapt to changing times. The system born by Lenin and raised by Stalin needed a strong leader in order to affect change. Brezhnev was not a man for such a task. Within a decade of his death the Soviet giant was no more, the ghost of Stalin still present at its last rites.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonid_Brezhnev

A later version attached Gorbachev to the joke, with his contribution to say: ‘Comrades, lets get out and push!’, from: Mary McAuley, Soviet Politics 1917-1991, 1992, p.88

To further deteriorate Brezhnev’s position in history, Treadgold & Ellison note Bertramn D. Wolfe’s “law of diminishing dictators”, adding: ‘Lenin was a commanding personality in all respects; Stalin was intellectually limited but all-powerful; Khrushchev had much less power, despite high visibility; Brezhnev “is not there at all.”’, from: Donald W. Treadgold & Herbert J. Ellison, Twentieth Century Russia, 2000, p.385

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment (Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States), 1998, p.421

Stephen White, ‘A New Soviet Politics?’, from: Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics, 1990, p.12

Vladimir Andrle, A Social History of Twentieth-Century Russia, 1994, p.247

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment (Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States), 1998, p.424

Treadgold & Ellison believe ‘Détente came to be widely recognized as at least an official description of the goals of both American and Soviet leaders, and perhaps as something more’. Other standout agreements in this period included the banning of biological weapons (signed by more than 70 nations, including the USSR and USA, in 1972) and the summit meetings held in Washington (June 1973) and Moscow (June 1974). Donald W. Treadgold & Herbert J. Ellison, Twentieth Century Russia, 2000, pp.395-396

Stephen White, ‘A New Soviet Politics?’, from: Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics, 1990, p.12

The research was conducted by VTsIOM, found at: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonid_Brezhnev

Richard Sakwa, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union 1917-1991, 1999, p.330

Ronald J. Hill, The Soviet Union – Politics, Economics and Society From Lenin to Gorbachev, 1989, p.172. Furthermore, Hill (p.xviii) notes the growth indicators in the period: Between 1970-80 national income was 6.8%, by 1988 it slumped to 4.4%; between 1970-80 industry was 8.4%, by 1988 it was 3.9%; between 1970-80 heavy industry was 8.9%, by 1988 it was 3.5%; whilst between 1970-80 agriculture was 1.0%, by 1988 it, too, had fallen, to 0.7%.

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment (Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States), 1998, pp.425-426

Quoted in: Ronald J. Hill, The Soviet Union – Politics, Economics and Society From Lenin to Gorbachev, 1989, p.170

Andrle notes how ‘resources were still being wasted on the production of things that people were not buying and random spot-checks found that between 25 and 40 per cent of the household appliances passing through the shop were defective’ (Vladimir Andrle, A Social History of Twentieth-Century Russia, 1994, p.253).

Furterhmore, Hill believes that the bad quality was ‘commonplace in the Soviet press’ (Ronald J. Hill, The Soviet Union – Politics, Economics and Society From Lenin to Gorbachev, 1989, p.170).

Ronald J. Hill, The Soviet Union – Politics, Economics and Society From Lenin to Gorbachev, 1989, p.172

Vladimir Andrle, A Social History of Twentieth-Century Russia, 1994, p.252

Quoted in: Ronald J. Hill, The Soviet Union – Politics, Economics and Society From Lenin to Gorbachev, 1989, p.168

ibid p.168

Marshall I. Goldman, ‘The Consumer’, from: James Calcraft (ed.), The Soviet Union Today – An Interpretative Guide, 1988, p.197

Ronald J. Hill, The Soviet Union – Politics, Economics and Society From Lenin to Gorbachev, 1989, p.173

D. Gale Johnson, ‘Agriculture’, from: James Calcraft (ed.), The Soviet Union Today – An Interpretative Guide, 1988, p.198

ibid p.200

ibid p.198

Ronald J. Hill, The Soviet Union – Politics, Economics and Society From Lenin to Gorbachev, 1989, p.173

ibid p.176

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment (Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States), 1998, p.434

Ronald J. Hill, The Soviet Union – Politics, Economics and Society From Lenin to Gorbachev, 1989, p.168

Alec Nove, Stalinism and After, 1984, p.167

There were many incidents between the USSR and the Republic of China, such as the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964 and clashes on the Manchuria border in 1969. The competition between both to lead the socialist world led to a prolonged series of polemics throughout the period, with Andrle noting that China ‘remained a thorn in the flesh’ of the Brezhnev leadership (Vladimir Andrle, A Social History of Twentieth-Century Russia, 1994, p.247).

Andrei Amalrik, ‘Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?’ from: Richard Sakwa, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union 1917-1991, 1999, p.402

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment (Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States), 1998, p424. Furthermore, the waste of the military is seen in the ‘unnessary’ rise of the navy, in which Sakwa believes ‘at the first sign of conflict the huge Black Sea fleet would be bottled up and not allowed to enter the Mediterrannean trhough the Dardanelles’ (Richard Sakwa, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union 1917-1991, 1999, p.361).

This led to the expansion of expensive projects: in oil and gas (‘the Tyumen fields in West Siberia), coal and hydro-electric and atomic power’, yet with small returns (Peter Rutland, ‘Economic Management and Reform’ from: Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics, 1990, p.162)

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment (Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States), 1998, p.425

Ronald J. Hill, The Soviet Union – Politics, Economics and Society From Lenin to Gorbachev, 1989, p.177

Peter Rutland, ‘Economic Management and Reform’ from: Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics, 1990, p.172

The original reforms were headed by the P.M. Kosygin in 1965 in which managerial supervision was to be cut, with profits/sales figures as indicators of success. The next signicant attempt was made in 1973 in which a reduction in ministerial interference was mapped out, however, it only served to complicate an already swollen bureaucracy. Whilst in 1979 the NNO (normative net output) reform sought to put value in place, rather than output of figures. Yet, as Rutland states, it ‘sank beneath the surface of an economy reeling from bottlenecks and shortages’ (Peter Rutland, ‘Economic Management and Reform’ from: Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics, 1990, p.173)

Quoted in Ronald J. Hill, The Soviet Union – Politics, Economics and Society From Lenin to Gorbachev, 1989, p.192

Richard Sakwa, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union 1917-1991, 1999, p.352

Jerry F. Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition, 1980, p.132

Alec Nove, Stalinism and After, 1984, p.164

Andrei Amalrik, ‘Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?’ from: Richard Sakwa, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union 1917-1991, 1999, p.399

Donald W. Treadgold & Herbert J. Ellison, Twentieth Century Russia, 2000, p.403

Richard Sakwa, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union 1917-1991, 1999, p.378

ibid p.365

Mary McAuley, Soviet Politics 1917-1991, 1992, p.79

Vladimir Andrle, A Social History of Twentieth-Century Russia, 1994, p.264

Mary McAuley, Soviet Politics 1917-1991, 1992, p.85

Donald W. Treadgold & Herbert J. Ellison, Twentieth Century Russia, 2000, p.402

Jerry F. Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition, 1980, p.150

ibid p.61

Hough believes Brezhnev preferred ‘familiar faces’ (p.73); with additions to the Politburo having been ‘personal associates’ of Brezhnev from between two to four decades (p.14).

Mark R. Beissinger, ‘The Leadership and the Political Elite’ from: James Calcraft (ed.), The Soviet Union Today – An Interpretative Guide, 1988, p.37

Although the change at the top was ‘remarkably sluggish’, people were accomdated in positions by the creation of more ministires: from 47 in 1966 to 63 in 1980 (Jerry F. Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition, 1980, p.73).

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment (Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States), 1998, p.423

Brezhnev’s health declined in tandem with the economy. The strokes he experienced in the mid-1970s resulted in his speech becoming ‘increasingly slurred, his breathing laboured, his concentration limited’ (Stephen White, ‘A New Soviet Politics?’, from: Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics, 1990, p.14). Ironically, he died as a show of strength to combat critics on his illness, when he‘appeared on the rostrum in bitter cold’ for the Revolution annivassary. As Treadgold & Ellison note, ‘Three days later he was dead’. (Donald W. Treadgold & Herbert J. Ellison, Twentieth Century Russia, 2000, p.406)

Mary McAuley, Soviet Politics 1917-1991, 1992, p.79

Yanov believes the term nomenklatura to be misleading: ‘In reality we are dealing with a broad and contradictory spectrum of Soviet elites, some of which are agents of political modernization – and in this sense potential allies of the West – while others are agents of stagnation or counterrefrom and thus our irreconcilable adversaries’, from: Alexander Yanov, ‘Is Sovietology Reformable?’ from: Robert O. Crummey (ed.), Reform in Russia and the U.S.S.R., 1989, p.259

Quoted in The New York Times, 3 December 1978, from: Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience (Politics & History Since 1917), 1986, p.139

Vladimir Andrle, A Social History of Twentieth-Century Russia, 1994, p.253

Stephen White, ‘A New Soviet Politics?’, from: Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics, 1990, p.13

The medals Brezhnev received range from the Hero of the Soviet Union to the Order of Lenin. He also received the Order of Victory (the highest Soviet military award, given only once since the end of the Second World War – though it was revoked posthumously in 1989 for not meeting the full requirements). And despite his lack of theoretical knowledge, he was even awarded the Gold Medal of Karl Marx for his ‘outstanding contribution to the development of Marxist-Leninist theory’! (Stephen White, ‘A New Soviet Politics?’, from: Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics, 1990, p.13)

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment (Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States), 1998, p.436

Mary McAuley, Soviet Politics 1917-1991, 1992, p.80

Mark R. Beissinger, ‘The Leadership and the Political Elite’ from: James Calcraft (ed.), The Soviet Union Today – An Interpretative Guide, 1988, p.38

Alfred B. Evans Jr, ‘Rethinking Soviet Socialism’ from: Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics, 1990, p.36

James R. Millar is a lone voice in declaring that the methods of handling the economy in the Brezhnev years was different than in the Stalin era, adding that ‘the current leadership confronts an economy that is quite different in both structure and performance from the one that faced Khruschev in 1953 or Brezhnev in 1964’ (James R. Millar, ‘Economy: An Overview’ from: James Calcraft (ed.), The Soviet Union Today – An Interpretative Guide, 1988, p.178).

Alfred B. Evans Jr, ‘Rethinking Soviet Socialism’ from: Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics, 1990, p.34

Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience (Politics & History Since 1917), 1986, p.140

ibid p.146

Such conservatism can be traced back before the rise of the Bolsheviks. With only a brief flirtation with democracy, the main political structure in place was that of abolsutlatism. Yanov believes that ‘to imagine Russia can part with its centuries-long political tradition and colete its journey into political modernity without a serious upheaval is beyond both historical precedent and common sense’ (Alexander Yanov, ‘Is Sovietology Reformable?’ from: Robert O. Crummey (ed.), Reform in Russia and the U.S.S.R., 1989, p.267). Furthermore, Nove adds that ‘given Russian political traditions, a Brezhnev or a Kosygin cannot envisage allowing Western-style freedom, not only because this might threaten them, but because it could lead to chaos… Many Soviet citizens are so fearful of chaos that they are prepared to tolerate Brezhnev and Kosygin, whatever they think of them, lest worse befall’ (Alec Nove, Stalinism and After, 1984, p.175). Nove continues this thought, concoting a fictional speech of Brezhnev’s, in which the General Secretary tells his critics: ‘It would never do for us to allow free discussion of such things. We must keep control. We are a country without democratic traditions. Your people are inoculated by centuries of exposure to conflicting ideas, our are all too susceptible to oppositionist demgagouery’ (p.186).

Alec Nove, Stalinism and After, 1984, p.176

Mary McAuley, Soviet Politics 1917-1991, 1992, p.81

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment (Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States), 1998, p.423

Cohen believes that ‘privately, some Soviet reformers lamented, “To impose real change, we would need a new Stalin, and no one wants that!”’ Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience (Politics & History Since 1917), 1986, p.148

The debate of whether such the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable continues. Many contemporaries, as many historians today, believed that the problems in the USSR could be overcome – such as Alexander Yanov, Timothy J. Colton and James R. Millar.